Employment contract review: what would you ask to change?

Clause 5 prohibits the Employee for twelve months after employment ends from working for, advising or holding any interest in any business anywhere in the world that competes with any current or planned activity of the Employer. Three features combine to make this unusually restrictive: it is worldwide rather than limited to the Employer's actual market; it covers not only competitive employment but also advising and any shareholding or other interest, however small or passive; and it refers to 'planned' activities, which the Employee cannot verify and which the Employer could characterise broadly. The duration extends well beyond the notice period in clause 6, so the Employee would be unpaid and restricted for a substantial period after leaving. There is no carve-out for passive investments, no carve-out for roles unconnected with the Employer's confidential information or client relationships, and no geographic or activity limitation. Whether such a restraint is enforceable under English law depends on it protecting a legitimate business interest and being no wider than reasonably necessary, and that assessment is fact-dependent; the breadth as drafted is a material risk to the Employee regardless.

Negotiation guidance: The Employer's legitimate interest is confidential information, client relationships and goodwill. Those are protected by a shorter, targeted restriction; a worldwide ban on any competing interest is broader than that interest requires and is the kind of term that is difficult to justify and costly to police.

The restraint preserves the Employer's legitimate interests only to the extent it protects confidential information, client connections and goodwill the Employee actually handled. A worldwide, all-activity, twelve-month ban on any interest in any competitor, including 'planned' activities, goes beyond that and captures the Employee's general skill and future employment, which is the classic overreach that makes a restraint vulnerable and, even if narrowed by a court, creates practical and financial hardship in the meantime.

Preferred position: A six-month restriction limited to the Employee's own role, the Employer's actual UK business and the clients/contacts the Employee dealt with, with an express passive-investment carve-out.

Fallback position: If the Employer insists on twelve months, at minimum limit it to the Employer's actual business in the UK and to competing services or solicitation of clients the Employee personally dealt with, add a passive-investment carve-out above a stated percentage, and remove 'planned' activities.

Financial impact: Potentially up to twelve months of lost salary and career progression if the Employee cannot take a comparable role, plus the cost of enforcing or defending the restriction.

Clause 6 allows the Employer to deduct all training costs incurred during the previous two years from final pay, irrespective of why employment ends. It therefore applies on any termination, including termination by the Employer, redundancy or resignation for good reason, and it applies to all training costs even if the training was general, was required by the Employer, or has long since been amortised by the Employee's service. The deduction is expressed as a deduction from final pay rather than as a debt reduced by months served, which risks the same amount being recovered twice (once as a deduction and again as an alleged loss). Conversely, final pay may be insufficient to cover the deducted sum, leaving an asserted debt overhang. Under English law, deductions from wages are subject to statutory controls, and a blanket deduction irrespective of reason is more exposed; the breadth of the clause is a material risk to the Employee in any event.

Negotiation guidance: A training-cost recovery clause is fair when it protects a genuine, documented investment and applies only where the Employee leaves soon afterwards. Applying it to all costs for two years on any termination, including Employer-initiated termination, and taking it twice goes beyond that purpose.

The purpose of a training-cost clause is ordinarily to recover the Employer's investment where the Employee leaves shortly after benefiting from it. An unqualified two-year lookback payable on any termination (including Employer-initiated termination) does not serve that purpose, captures general and mandatory training, and risks double counting the same sum as both a deduction and a debt. Limiting the trigger, the qualifying costs and the repayment schedule aligns the clause with its purpose and reduces the Employee's exposure.

Preferred position: Repayment only on the Employee's voluntary resignation within twelve months of a documented, agreed, specific training programme, at an amount equal to the documented eligible cost multiplied by the number of complete months remaining in that twelve-month period divided by twelve, with nothing due after twelve months and no double recovery against final pay.

Fallback position: If the Employer insists on a longer lookback, cap the repayable amount at the documented eligible cost of the specific programme and provide that any repayment is reduced (not duplicated) by amounts already deducted from final pay.

Financial impact: The clause is uncapped as drafted; exposure is the total documented training costs incurred in the previous two years, potentially several thousand pounds, and could exceed final pay.

Clause 4 assigns to the Employer all intellectual property created during employment whether created at work or in personal time and whether or not connected with the Employer's business. That captures genuinely personal projects, side work and creative output with no connection to the Employer. The same clause separately assigns the Employee's pre-existing design library and prevents the Employee from reusing it without the Employer's written consent. The result is that the Employee loses both future unrelated personal work and existing pre-employment material, and needs the Employer's permission to use the Employee's own prior work. There is no carve-out for work created with no Employer resources, equipment or confidential information, and no licence-back for the pre-existing library. This is a material departure from the usual position that an employer owns work created in the course of employment, and it has long-term career consequences for a designer.

Negotiation guidance: The Employer needs to own what it commissions and to protect its confidential information and client projects. That is achieved by an assignment limited to work created in the course of employment or using Employer resources; extending it to unrelated personal work and to the Employee's pre-existing library is not necessary to serve that interest.

The Employer's legitimate interest is ownership of work produced for it and protection of its confidential information and client projects. That interest does not require ownership of genuinely personal, unrelated creative work or of material the Employee created before joining. The pre-existing library is the Employee's existing asset; assigning it outright and requiring the Employer's consent even to reuse it is disproportionate and outside the normal purpose of an employment IP clause.

Preferred position: Assignment limited to work created in the course of employment or using Employer resources, with an express carve-out for genuinely personal, unrelated work and retention of the pre-existing library with a licence-back to the Employer for incorporated elements.

Fallback position: If the Employer requires wide ownership of work created during employment, at minimum carve out personal-time work created without Employer resources or information, and retain the pre-existing library with a licence back to the Employer.

Financial impact: The value of the assigned pre-existing library and of unrelated personal creative work is difficult to quantify but could include the entire commercial value of the Employee's portfolio and any existing licensing income.

Clause 6 requires the Employee to give three months' written notice while the Employer may terminate on one week's written notice regardless of length of service. The Employer may also dismiss without notice for gross misconduct. The asymmetry means the Employee bears a long notice burden and restricted mobility, while the Employer can end the relationship almost immediately. The clause does not state whether the Employer may make a payment in lieu of the Employee's notice, whether garden leave is available, or what happens to unvested or accrued pay on immediate Employer termination. The asymmetry combines with the bonus forfeiture in clause 2, so an Employer-given one-week notice can also eliminate an otherwise earned bonus.

Negotiation guidance: The Employer can still protect continuity through a shorter, reciprocal notice period and garden leave on full pay. A three-month burden on the Employee against a one-week right for the Employer is difficult to justify on mobility grounds.

A long unilateral notice obligation on the Employee with a very short Employer notice right transfers mobility risk to the Employee without reciprocal protection. Aligning or shortening the notice periods, and clarifying garden leave and accrued entitlements, makes the termination regime more balanced while leaving the Employer able to dismiss promptly for gross misconduct.

Preferred position: One month's notice for both parties, with garden leave on full pay during notice and preservation of accrued entitlements.

Fallback position: If the Employer will not reduce its own notice right, at least reduce the Employee's notice to one month and confirm garden leave on full pay and preservation of accrued salary, holiday pay and any earned bonus.

Financial impact: Up to three months' delay in starting new employment for the Employee, and potential loss of an earned bonus on a short Employer notice.

Clause 2 provides that the Employee may receive a bonus of up to 15% of salary, but the Employer has absolute discretion over amount, targets and payment date and may change them at any time, and no bonus is payable if either party has given notice before the payment date. The combination means the bonus is not a reliable part of remuneration: the targets can be changed after the fact, and even a bonus already earned on performance can be lost because the Employer has given notice (which the Employee does not control). The clause does not state whether any minimum is guaranteed, whether targets will be set in advance and communicated, or whether a bonus is treated as earned once performance conditions are met.

Negotiation guidance: The Employer can retain discretion over award levels while still setting targets prospectively and not removing a bonus already earned simply because the Employer itself has given notice. That preserves the incentive purpose of the bonus.

The bonus is the Employee's main variable reward and should not be lost through an event the Employee does not control. Retrospective changes to targets and forfeiture triggered by the Employer's own notice make the headline 'up to 15%' unreliable. Clear prospective targets and a forfeiture rule limited to the Employee's own resignation restore a reasonable relationship between performance and reward without removing the Employer's discretion over amount.

Preferred position: Targets set in writing prospectively at the start of the bonus year, no retrospective adverse changes, forfeiture only on the Employee's voluntary resignation, and pro-rating for part years.

Fallback position: If the Employer maintains full discretion, at minimum preserve a bonus already earned for a completed performance period even if the Employer has given notice, and set targets in writing at the start of the year.

Financial impact: Up to 15% of GBP 60,000, that is up to GBP 9,000 per year, is at risk; the exact exposure depends on the targets set. This figure is a negotiation illustration based on the stated salary, not a guaranteed entitlement.

Clause 3 gives 25 paid holiday days per holiday year plus public holidays in England, with the holiday year running from January to December. The employment starts on 1 November 2026, so the first holiday year is only two months long. The clause does not state how holiday entitlement is pro-rated for the first and last part years, whether holiday may be taken during notice, or what happens to accrued but untaken holiday on termination. Statutory leave rights apply as required by law, which provides a floor, but the contractual position on pro-ration and payment in lieu is not stated.

Negotiation guidance: A short pro-ration sentence protects both parties by removing ambiguity about first-year and final-year holiday.

The start date falls late in the holiday year, so the entitlement for the first year must be pro-rated to be meaningful. Without a pro-ration and payment-in-lieu provision, the parties may disagree on the Employee's first-year and final-year entitlement even though statutory minimums apply as a floor.

Preferred position: Express pro-ration of holiday in part holiday years and payment for accrued untaken holiday on termination.

Fallback position: Rely on statutory minimum accrual if the Employer declines a contractual pro-ration provision, but confirm the position in writing.

Financial impact: The value of a few days of holiday pay, which is modest but should be clarified.